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Claims that 80% of laws adopted in the EU Member States
originate in Brussels actually tell us very little about the
impact of EU policy-making
How many national laws originate in Brussels? Does the European Union (EU) significantly
shape the policy agenda of its Member States? Annette Elisabeth Toeller assesses
current research on the Europeanization of public policies. She argues that such findings
must be handled with great care because they have always been used for political
purposes.
We are of ten told that many national laws in Europe are shaped to one degree or
another by policy-making at the EU-level, and whenever there is a major Treaty change,
implying changes in both EU-competences and procedures, this issue and the numbers involved are
discussed by national media in Europe. But how many of  these laws actually originate in Brussels? Data
f rom research on the impact of  EU-policy making on the Member State level has to be handled with great
care. First, it has always been used f or polit ical purposes, and second, studies in this area are of ten f ar
f rom providing a reliable picture.
Debates and discussion about the Europeanization of  national legislation began when in 1988, shortly
af ter the Single European Act became ef f ective, the President of  the European Commission, Jacques
Delors to European Parliament that “in ten years 80 per cent of  the legislation related to economics,
maybe also to taxes and social af f airs, will be of  Community origin”. While this was no more than a
prophecy, a f orecast of  the f uture that was not based on scientif ic data or methods, it gained
momentum when only f ew years later the Maastricht Treaty was challenged in Germany bef ore the
German Constitutional Court. Then the prophecy was turned into a diagnosis of  the actual situation:
““The claimant, ref erring to an assessment made by the President of  the European Commission, Delors
[. . .], brings f orward that already now almost 80 per cent of  all legislation in the f ield of  economic law [. . .]
is determined by Community law”.
At the same time in France, the Conseil d’ État reacted to Delors’ prophecy when considering how f ar
French law had been penetrated by European law. In autumn 2004, the Netherlands experienced a heated
public debate af ter the Secretary of  the State f or European Af f airs, Atzo Nicolai, stated that 60 per cent
of  all laws and regulations that are in ef f ect in the Netherlands have their origin in Brussels. Later on,
commentators suggested that the share of  Europeanized Dutch legislation was between 70 and 80 per
cent. Similar f igures were discussed in Austria and again in Germany. In most cases national polit icians
used the f igures to exaggerate and demonize the European impact on the policy-making autonomy of
member states, while in some cases (in the context of  European Parliamentary elections) they were used
simply to emphasize the relevance of  the European Union and to convince people to use their voting
right.
When we looked at scholarly research in this f ield, we f ound that it was not only driven by the wish “to
get the f igures straight”, i.e. to rationalize the debates by producing reliable f igures with a robust method.
Rather, these numbers were seen as an indicator either of  a loss in the decision making ability of
national Parliaments or – in more general terms – of  a transf ormation of  the nation state.
We looked f irst at studies on Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands and Denmark. Others
on France, Austria and Finland f ollowed. The striking f inding is that most of  these studies showed rather
low shares of  Europeanized national legislation: 15.5 per cent f or the UK, 14 per cent f or Denmark, 10.6
per cent f or Austria, between 3 and 27 per cent f or France, between 1 and 24 per cent f or Finland, yet
39.1 per cent f or Germany.
Do these numbers tell us that the impact of  European policy making is by and large minimal, while at the
same time there are some interesting variations between member states? No – in f act, these f igures can
tell us very litt le about the impact of  EU-policy-making.
First, looking at overall numbers on all policy f ields make litt le sense. It is well known not only to experts
of  EU-policy-making that both EU competences and procedures can vary a great deal between policy
f ields and even within policy f ields. Some policy f ields (such as external trade, competit ion, agriculture,
environment, f inancial markets) are strongly integrated while others (such as education, health, social
security) are not at all or much less integrated. Thus the impact on national policy making should vary as
well between these policy f ields.
Second, one has to be aware that all such studies in this area are based on two assumptions: f irst that a
policy is shaped to a relevant degree by legislation (this is the case in most policy f ields except f or
external relations and def ense); second that a European impact can be identif ied in this legislation. This
assumption holds true especially in regulatory f ields, such as environmental policy or the regulation of
f inancial markets. Here, a high relevance of  EU policy-making can be identif ied in high shares of
Europeanized legislation. On the opposite side, there are areas like competit ion policy where the
Commission has f ar reaching decision-making competences derived f rom the Treaty and does not need
to go the cumbersome way of  inf luencing national legislation. Thus here our methods cannot adequately
spot the European inf luence in national legislation. The same holds true f or national budgeted policy
where we cannot identif y the impact of  the stability and growth pact in national budget acts.
Third, the low values that most studies show about do not indicate a low level of  European level
inf luence but are the result of  a rather parsimonious measurement of  Europeanization. For these
studies a Europeanized piece of  national legislation is a law that serves to implement a European
directive. Apart f or the many problems involved in identif ying such legal acts this is a much too narrow a
way, since so many other “things” coming f rom Brussels do have an impact: directly applicable regulations
which usually do not materialize in national legislation but “bypass” it, decisions by the European Courts,
the Treaty itself , just to mention the most important legally binding “European impulses”. Litt le
surprisingly, the more encompassing the measurement, the higher the share of  Europeanized legislation
that it f inds.
Fourth, the identif ication of  a European impact is based on a purely f ormal argument (if  a national legal
act serves to implement a directive, it will most probably be inf luenced by it) while the causal impact as
such is not certain. What is more, we can say nothing on the intensity of  this impact. We cannot tell if  a
notational law is inf luenced by a directive only at the surf ace, or if  it  introduces a completely new policy
due to the directive.
Finally, the f ocus of  the research tends to reduce the complexity of  multi- level polit ics and to bias the
results. The question of  Europeanization research is on the domestic impact in Europe, and the f ocus is
on the Member States and how they are inf luenced, which tends to make us see Member States as
victims of  EU-policy-making while widely neglecting that without the activity of  the same Member States
on the European level there would be no European policy at all. However, if  in a single case or a number
of  cases a member state was active in having a certain policy adopted on the European level, or whether
it f ought against it and succumbed in majority voting in the Council, cannot be identif ied in our f igures
even though intuit ion tells us that this plays a role.
Actual numbers presented in this sort of  research should be handled with great care. All they can do is
give us a f irst, very rough idea of  the scope of  the European impact on national legislation. Figures make
only sense as long as they are dif f erentiated between policy f ields. Present data on the Europeanization
of  policy f ields are not comparable between countries because they are based on (dif f erently
constructed) portf olios. Low numbers of  Europeanized legislation do not necessarily mean a low
European impact. The f amous 80 per cent could be reality in f ields like agriculture, environment or
regulation of  the f inancial market. Yet, rule production on EU level has been on the retreat since the late
1990s – so f ar we do not know if  this will be ref lected in less Europeanized national legislation. There
are, however, areas in which there is a major European impact which we cannot measure. With the recent
new policies f or the stabilization of  the European Currency at least f or Euro-Countries the f ield in which
Europeanization is not adequately ref lected in national legislation is growing. While this is not a crit icism,
we must remember that when using f igures f or both, polit ical or scholarly arguments we need to be
aware what the f igures can or cannot tell us.
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